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The Effect of Previous Failure and Instruction
on Experimenting versus Consistent Decision Making
Campbell (1969) points out the potential utility
of an experimenting as opposed to a consistent approach
to managerial decision making. That is, rather than
being committed to one particular policy or decision, a
manager should be open to feedback on his or her
performance and be able to consider other, potentially
better, policies. This openness to feedback allows a
manager to consider other policy options and thus
allows him or her to have a more experimenting rather
than consistent approach to managerial decision making
as defined by Campbell (1969). Recent research has
examined the role of various variables that are
considered to have an influence on a manager's
preference for either an experimenting or consistent
approach to decision making. Staw and his associates
(e.g., Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw, 1976; Staw, 1981; Staw &
Fox, 1977; Staw & Ross, 1978; Staw & Ross, 1980; Staw,
1986) have been especially noteworthy in this regard
(also see Janis & Mann, 1977, for a general review of
this decision-making behavior).
Staw has examined the role of self- justification
in a manager's escalation of commitment to a failing
policy (i.e. being consistent when it is not beneficial
to do so). For example, Staw (1976) found that
subjects were more committed to a failing rather than a
successful policy and that this commitment was greatest
when they were personally responsible for choosing that
particular policy (in contrast to having the policy
chosen beforehand by someone else and consequently not
being responsible for it). Being committed to a
failing policy, as Staw indicates, is often not the
appropriate action for a manager to take. Although the
manager may not realize why he or she is behaving in a
certain manner (i.e. experimenting or consistent), it
seems clear from Staw's research that there are times
when a person is emotionally committed to a specific
course of action. As noted by Donaldson and Lorsch
(1983), "most of these executives are strongly
attached, almost religiously devoted, to their beliefs.
Moreover, these emotional convictions shape in
important ways the pattern of decisions that are
labeled corporate strategy" (p. 111).
Real-world examples of this escalation of
commitment phenomenon are numerous, and demonstrate it
potentially serious consequences. For instance, one
commonly cited example is President Johnson's decision
making during the Vietnam War. Janis and Mann (1977)
note, "we cited as an example of the binding quality of
a commitment President Johnson's increased reluctance
to reverse his war policy and withdraw U.S. troops from
East Asia once he had publicly announced his
determination to prevent a Communist victory in
Vietnam" (p. 280). Even after receiving negative
feedback about his policy decision, Johnson escalated
his commitment and resources to his original decision.
Though the historical and political anecdotes relating
this cognitive process to actual behavior are
interesting and should not be overlooked, the major
concern of this paper is on the escalation of
commitment among managers in a business context. Thus
an attempt will be made to determine some of the
variables that influence a manager's escalation of
commitment to a failing policy (and consequently the
lack of experimentation with potentially more effective
policies )
.
Research has discovered relevant variables, in
addition to self- justification, that influence a
manager's experimenting or consistent approach to
decision making. For example, Staw and Fox (1977)
looked at the influence of time and the efficacy of
resources (high versus low) on the escalation of
commitment phenomenon. In their study, negative
results were presented to subjects over three simulated
time periods (1974, 1977, and 1980), in an attempt to
examine the role of time on both high and low
responsibility subjects (i.e. subjects who thought they
were responsible for all three of the allocation
decisions vs. subjects who thought the initial
allocation decision was not under their control, even
though the final two decisions were). They found that
the commitment process, to some extent, fluctuated over
time. Subjects in a high-responsibility condition
were most committed to a certain policy immediately
after they were given negative feedback. This
commitment dropped significantly, however, from Time 1
to Time 2 (i.e. from a 1974 allocation decision to a
1977 allocation decision). In addition, they found
that high-responsibility subjects tended to have
greater commitment at Time 3 (1980) than at Time 2
(1977), but not as much as they had at Time 1 (1974).
The decisions made by low-responsibility subjects, on
the other hand, changed little over the three time
periods
.
The Staw and Fox (1977) study also showed an
immediate effect for the efficacy of resources on the
commitment process. That is, subjects were told that
either there was a high or low likelihood that a
decision to allocate more funding would help the
financial condition of the company (high vs. low
efficacy). Results for the efficacy manipulation over
time were quite similar to the results reported above
for the high-responsibility condition. That is,
subjects in the high-efficacy condition had somewhat
unstable data over time; they committed the largest
amount of resources at Time 1 (1974), the least amount
at Time 2 (1977), and a moderate amount at Time 3
(1980). The data for the low efficacy condition, in
contrast, were relatively stable over time. In
interpreting these results Staw and Fox (1977) note,
"it is possible that subjects perceived that the
decreased investment of R&D from their Time 2 decisions
had contributed to the continuing decline in financial
results, and that this downtrend could still be
arrested by increased investment at Time 3. In any
event, escalation did not diminish over time as one
might expect when individuals are given negative
feedback or 'punishment' over repeated trials" (p.
6447).
Fox and Staw (1979) looked at the role that policy
resistance and job insecurity (variables thought to
heighten political vulnerability) have on a subject's
commitment to a previous course of action. These
researchers attempted to create a situation in which
subjects would lose (politically) if a chosen course of
action failed. They hypothesized that if a subject's
policy decision failed under these conditions (of
political vulnerability), it would almost force them to
remain committed to it, even in the face of failure
("the trapped administrator"). Their results showed
that as job insecurity and policy resistance increased,
so did commitment. In contrast, subjects who faced a
condition of low job insecurity and low resistance
invested the lowest amount of resources to a prior
course of action (i.e. low commitment). Fox and Staw
(1979) use these results to suggest that the "trapped
administrator" is the one who is most likely to become
highly committed to a policy decision and also become
inflexible to any possible changes.
Another potential influence on commitment has been
described by Staw and Ross (1980). These researchers
found that a stereotype exists for effective managers
as being consistent, and not experimenting, in the face
of failure. This stereotype would also have a definite
effect on a manager's willingness to experiment.
Recently, however, this stereotype has been questioned
by Knight (1984) and Knight and Saal (1986).
Knight (1984) and Knight and Saal (1986) suggest
that there is not a stereotype against experimentation,
but rather that our evaluation of a manager is based
upon evidence of his or her competence, and that policy
consistency can have implications for perceptions of
competence (see also Medcof & Evans, 1986, for data
that replicates Knight's, 1984, results with
business-experienced subjects). That is, it is
possible to confound success with strategy (consistent
vs. experimenting) in certain experimental situations,
such that a successful, consistent manager is viewed
more positively than a successful, experimenting
manager who initially failed on a task. The
experimenting, successful manager in the above example
would, by definition, have had to initially made the
wrong decision on the task, whereas the consistent,
successful manager would have had to initially made the
correct decision on the task. According to Knight
(1984), however, the relevant variable is not strategy
8but rather competence. He notes, "there is not a
general bias against experimenting managers, and, in
fact, if the experimenting is preceded by evidence of
task succes or competence, it may enhance performance
ratings, and thus increase the attractiveness of
Campbell's (1969) experimenting approach to management"
(Knight, 1984, p. 321). (See Staw, 1981, and Bass,
1983, for reviews of the literature on the escalation
of commitment. )
Additional research has looked at the role of
personality variables in the commitment process. For
example, Weiss and Knight (1980) found that there was a
relationship between the self-esteem of a subject and
his information search and problem-solving efficiency
on a task. They found that low self-esteem subjects
were more likely to search for information and that, in
situations where information search was beneficial to
problem solving, they performed better than high
self-esteem subjects. Knight and Nadel (1986) looked
at the role that self-esteem plays in a subject's
decision-making behavior during a management simulation
task. They found a relationship between self-esteem
and managerial flexibility, with low self-esteem
subjects being more willing to experiment than high
9self-esteem subjects. Further research (Knight &
Kuziej, 1986) also found support for this finding.
The above research dealing with self-esteem is
interesting because it reveals that the common belief
that a manager needs high self-esteem to be effective
(e.g. Dipboye, 1977; Korman, 1976) is not always true.
That is, the high self-esteem manager may, at times, be
less willing to accept feedback about a failing policy
decision and thus be unwilling to change or experiment
with potentially better policy decisions.
The question becomes, then, in what situation is
high self-esteem beneficial and in what situation is
low self-esteem beneficial? A contingency approach is
required to answer this question. That is, managerial
effectiveness can be thought of as being contingent on
the right match of certain personal and organizational
elements (Mitchell, 1982). Thus, depending on the
situation, high or low self-esteem in a manager may
lead to the best outcome (i.e. an experimenting or a
consistent approach). For example, if a manager was
faced with a situation in which he or she was failing
and different policy options were available,
experimentation might be the best approach. However,
if a manager was in a situation in which one policy
10
option was clearly the best choice, but temporary-
conditions developed so that this best policy option
would not immediately lead to the optimal outcome, it
would probably be wise to stay with this preferred
option/decision, because in the long run it would lead
to the optimal outcome for the organization.
Self-Esteem and Consistency
Given that in some situations an experimenting
approach to management is the most appropriate action
to take, what can be done about the high self-esteem
manager who is resistant to a change in his or her
decisions? It seems that if there were some way to
instill the value of an experimenting approach in
certain situations, better performance would result.
One variable that has yet to be examined is the effect
that information about the utility of an experimenting
approach has on a high self-esteem subject. That is,
if one could inform the subject (manager) about the
potential benefits of experimentation, would that have
any effects on his or her subsequent behavior in a
management decision-making context? If it does have a
significant effect, this instruction could have many
practical benefits in organizational settings (e.g.
reduced costs and increased profits if one stops
11
wasting time and money on a failing policy and is
willing to experiment on potentially better policy
options). Thus, a method of instruction was utilized
in the present study in an attempt to make subjects
realize the potential impact and utility of an
experimenting approach to management.
It should be remembered that a contingency
approach to management is probably most preferable.
Although in some situations consistency is the best
policy, instructing managers to be consistent may not
be necessary. Research by Weiss (1978), for example,
showed that managers have relatively high self-esteem,
and since high self-esteem has been shown to be related
to consistent decision making (Knignt & Nadel, 1986),
it could be hypothesized that managers, in general, are
consistent in their decision making. In addition, as
noted previously, the results reported by Staw and Ross
(1980) suggest that a stereotype exists in which
effective managers are thought to be consistent, not
experimenting, in their decision making. These results
taken together would suggest that, in general, managers
are consistent rather than experimenting in their
decision making.
Low self-esteem managers, on the other hand, may
12
benefit from the opposite type of training—that is,
training about the potential benefits of being
consistent. Although this type of training program may
be important in certain contexts, it was not examined
in the present study. The present study does not
advocate the "training away" of this consistent
behavior in managers, but instead is a first attempt at
making managers more aware that, depending upon the
situation they are in, either a consistent or an
experimenting approach to decision making may be the
most prefered action to take.
Reactance Theory
In addition, this study examined reactance theory
and its relationship to experimentation. Staw and Ross
(1978) found that reactance theory predicted most
accurately the results of a study on the escalation of
commitment. Reactance theory, as formulated by Brehm
(1966) and extended by Wortman and Brehm (1975),
proposes that if a subject fails or feels that he or
she did not perform a task adequately, then he or she
will attend more to the situation (e.g. performance
feedback or attention to causal information related to
success) in an attempt to better his or her chances of
succeeding rather than failing in the future. Thus,
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according to reactance theory, the subject is acting
rationally in a prospective rather than in a
retrospective sense (i.e. self- justification and its
consequent effects on the escalation of commitment to a
failing policy would be retrospective rationality).
Staw and Ross (1978) found that a subject would
commit the smallest amount of resources when he or she
suffered a previous failure and this failure was due to
endogenous rather than exogenous (or chance) causes
(i.e. the failure resulted from their own behavior
rather than being caused by random, chance factors).
Failure due to chance factors did not cause the
subjects to deescalate their commitment. After all, if
a subject feels that he or she made the correct
decision and for chance reasons this decision failed,
he or she would probably not be worried about commiting
him or herself to this same policy in the future.
However, endogenous factors point to the subject's own
faulty decision making and thus do not allow him or her
to ignore the past failures due to his or her decision
making. (It is interesting to note that these findings
are inconsistent with the Staw, 1976, study discussed
previously. Staw and Ross, 1978, explain these
inconsistencies by noting that "resource allocation
14
decisions are complex social situations" and, as a
result, might depend on a number of
social/organizational variables and the individual
differences of the participants.)
The results from the Staw and Ross study reported
above support reactance theory in that they suggest
that the subject is concerned about his or her previous
failure and as a result is more sensitive to the
various cues of the environment (e.g. performance
feedback and relevant information about the cases).
This increased sensitivity will thus make it more
likely that the subject will make the most optimal
policy decision available to him or her in this task
(e.g. a decrease rather than an increase in resource
allocation or an experimenting approach to policy
decision-making). In regard to reactance theory Staw
and Ross (1978) note, "the value of the present
findings is that they show psychological reactance to
have the best predictive utility (and perhaps the
greatest net effect) in a simple decision-making
situation" (p. 160).
It seems then that reactance theory may be a rival
hypothesis for this commitment/experimenting effect.
That is, when a person has previously failed on a task
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and this failure is a result of his or her behavior, he
or she may, in an attempt to become more attentive to
the present situation, become less committed to a
failing policy. This prediction, it should be noted,
is counter to the self- justification prediction.
Self- justification theory would predict more commitment
by a subject even after he or she has failed on a task.
In other words, reactance theory will become "active"
only after sustained failure, but self- justification
will become active initally and will remain active
throughout the duration of a specific task or related
tasks
.
The prediction made in this study was that
escalation of commitment to a failing policy (or
consistently staying with a failing policy) would be
found throughout the duration of an initial task (i.e.
either a self- justification or a self-esteem
explanation); however, after the subject had failed on
this first task, he or she would become more attentive
to a second task and as a result not escalate his or
her commitment to a failing policy (i.e. a reactance
theory explanation).
Thus, this study looked at the separate and
combined effects of instruction and previous failure on
16
a subject's decision making. The prediction was that
both instruction and the previous failure on a task
would increase the subject's experimenting behavior.
However, the combined effects of previous failure and
instruction would be greater than their separate
effects. The following diagram (Figure 1 below)
illustrates this prediction (the dependent measure,
number of changes, is an index of the amount of
experimentation, the more changes made the more
experimenting the subject's behavior).
Self-Esteem and Reactance Theory Explanations
Self-esteem was examined in the present study for
two reasons. First, an attempt was made to replicate
previous findings on the role of self-esteem in
managerial flexibility (e.g. Knight and Nadel, 1986;
Knight and Kuziej , 1986). Second, the relationship
between previous failure and self-esteem was examined.
That is, Wells and Marwell (1976), observe that
self-esteem can be influenced or manipulated by
previous failure (referred to as "malleable self-esteem
theory" throughout this paper). Thus the relationship
between failure and self-esteem needs to be closely
examined in this area of research.
A relationship between previous failure and
17
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Figure 1
Predicted Effects of Previous Failure and Instruction on the
Number of Policy Changes made by a Subject
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lowered self-esteem would limit the potential
importance of reactance theory in explaining the extent
of subjects' experimentation. That is, experimentation
would not be the result of reactance theory, but rather
could be explained by lowered self-esteem in the
subject. The findings from the Staw and Fox (1977) and
the Staw and Ross (1978) studies, for example, could be
explained by either a lowered self-esteem effect or a
reactance theory effect. That is, subjects may have
deescalated their commitment to a policy decision after
receiving negative feedback because they either had a
decrease in self-esteem and thus became more
experimenting, or because they became more attentive to
their situation and thus became more experimenting and
less committed to a policy decision in an effort to
perform more effectively (reactance theory). The
present study was an attempt to provide the first test
between these two competing theories.
19
Method
Subjects
A total of 146 undergraduate psychology students
(79 females and 67 males) participated in the present
study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Procedure Overview
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four
different conditions in which they were asked to play
the role of a manager in a computer simulation task
(the experimental stimuli were computer presented).
Simulations have been used in business contexts (e.g.
assessment centers) so their use in this study seemed
justified (Finkle, 1976). Each subject was asked to
complete a self-esteem measure (Rosenberg, 1965) before
he or she began the actual simulation. After
receiving background information on the task itself,
the subject began the first simulation task. The
computer presented the subject with a management
scenario (Knight & Nadel , 1986) which spanned a total
of 24 weeks (see Appendix A). The subject was asked to
choose a specific course of action from three options
every two weeks. After a policy option was selected
the subject was given feedback on the effectiveness of
his or her decision. Thus, twelve policy decisions
20
were made by each subject during the first task. After
the first task was completed, the subject was given a
second task that was similar to the first (i.e. the
procedure was identical, but the scenario was
different). Again, the second simulation (see Appendix
B) spanned a 24-week period and the subject had the
option of maintaining or changing his or her policy
decisions every two weeks. After the subjects finished
the second simulation they completed a questionnaire
(see Appendix C) and were then fully debriefed.
Task The four conditions of this experiment are
diagrammed below:
Task 1 Task 2
success | instruction -> failure
success ! no instruction -> failure
failure | instruction -> failure
failure [ no instruction -> failure
Subjects in the first condition experienced
success (see Appendix A) at the first task, received
instruction (see Appendix D) before the second task,
and experienced failure in the second task. Subjects
in the second condition also experienced success at the
first task, but did not receive instruction (see
Appendix E) before the second task, at which they
Condition 1
.
Condition 2.
Condition 3.
Condition 4.
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failed. The final two conditions are identical to the
first two conditions with the exception that subjects
in these two groups failed on the first task.
Task 1
.
The first task was called the "Jet
Engine Problem." The subject was told that he or she
was a manager of a division in a large aircraft
corporation. In the past year, this division, which
manufactures jet engines, has had an increase in
defective engines (from zero percent to two percent).
The subject was instructed to lower the defect rate to
zero percent within a simulated 24-week period. Every
two weeks within this 24-week period, the subjects had
to decide whether to institute or continue one of the
following policies: (a) hire new inspectors, (b)
redesign engines, or (c) use stronger metals.
It was next explained that the subject had $10,000
to work with in the simulation. This amount would
either increase or decrease during the simulation,
depending on what the subject did and how "successful"
they were. For example, they lost $1000 whenever they
implemented a new policy. It cost them $100 for each
week that the defect rate was above two percent, and
they earned $100 each week that the defect rate was
below two percent. Finally, it cost the subject $50
22
each time they checked on the amount of money they had
left in their original $10,000 operating budget
(referred to as an account balance request; see
Appendix A for more details.)
Task 2
.
The second simulation had the same rules
and procedures as the first simulation. The subjects
were told that they were transferred to a sales and
public relations department in the company on the basis
of their performance in Task 1. The task was called
the "Ticket Bureau Problem." The subject's division
was instructed to increase the sales of a U.S. ticket
bureau. Again, three policy options existed: (a)
lower the cost of tickets, (b) begin an advertising
campaign, or (c) implement a frequent flyer program.
(See Appendix B for more details.
)
Instruction/No Instruction Manipulation To guard
against demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) the
instructions about the utility of an experimenting
approach had to be presented implicitly. Therefore, it
was explained to each subject at the beginning of Task
1 that this was a learning study and each subject was
asked to keep track of his or her performance by
completing the data sheet shown in either Appendix F or
G (depending on the instruction/no instruction
23
condition to which he or she was assigned). The
subject was told that his or her completed data sheet
would be shown to the next subject (see Appendix H for
the instructions given to the subjects).
The instructions were provided by presenting the
subject with a prepared "data sheet" (see Appendices D
and E) that outlined the decision-making ability of a
"previous subject." Of course, this "previous subject"
did not exist; however the subjects in the experiment
thought that they were examining the actual performance
of a subject on the first task of this experiment.
Depending upon the instruction condition to which the
subject was assigned, he or she either looked at a data
sheet that showed a "subject" who had failed on the
first task or a "subject" who had performed moderately
well on the first task (see Appendices D & E,
respectively). Subjects in the instruction condition
were asked to examine the data sheet of a previous
subject who had failed on the task. The data sheet
contained comments about the previous subject's
performance as well as the actual decisions made by
this "subject" (see Appendix D). The previous
subject's policy decisions were very consistent and the
comments on the bottom of the data sheet pointed this
24
out. As mentioned previously, it was hoped that
through vicarious learning the actual subject in this
instruction condition might learn about the beneficial
aspects of experimentation. The no-instruction data
sheet was designed to present innocuous comments that
would not affect the subject's decision making in the
second task (see Appendix E). After viewing this
"previous subject's" data sheet, the subjects began the
second task.
Success or failure on the first task was also
manipulated in this study. Subjects were given a
predetermined criterion that they had to reach before
the end of the task (i.e., a defect rate of 0% on the
first task and a reversal of the sales decline in the
second task). As mentioned previously, the subjects
were given feedback on their performance every two
weeks. If the subject was in the failure condition,
his or her performance always remained below the
criterion and there were never any signs of real
improvement. If the subject was in the success
condition (Task 1 only), he or she steadily improved in
terms of decreasing the defect rate until he or she
finally reached a zero percent defect rate at the end
of the 24-week simulation. If the subject did reach
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the criterion on the first task, they were informed of
their success. Conversely, the subjects who failed on
the first task were informed of their failure to solve
the "Jet Engine Problem" (see Appendix I for more
detail on the success/failure feedback provided to the
subjects). Of course, success or failure was
determined by the experimenter--the subject's behavior
had no influence on his or her alleged success or
failure
.
After the subjects completed the two tasks they
were fully debriefed and questioned about their
behavior. The questionnaires utilized in this study
are described in more detail below.
Self-esteem
Self-esteem was measured before the beginning of
the first task by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory
(Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix J). This is a 10-item
questionnaire in which subjects are asked to rate the
degree to which they agree or disagree with certain
statements about themselves. Scores on this scale
range from 10 to 40, with a 10 indicating low
self-esteem and a 40 high self-esteem. This scale has
been found to be valid and highly reliable (Robinson &
Shaver, 1973), and it is one of the most commonly used
26
measures of self-esteem by researchers (Wells &
Marwell, 1976; Lorr & Wunderlich, 1986).
Post-test questionnaire
A five-item questionnaire (four additional items
were embedded in the five item questionnaire making the
total nine items) was completed by each subject after
he or she finished both simulations (see Appendix C).
The questionnaire was designed to help the subject
describe his or her decision-making strategy. In
addition, the questionnaire attempted to uncover the
emotional reactions of the subjects to either their
failure or success. It was hypothesized that the
subject's verbal description of his or her strategy
would match his or her actual behavior, thus indicating
that the subject was aware of his or her
decision-making strategies in the face of failure or
success. It was also thought that the emotional
reactions of the subjects to their success or failure
would be related to their decision making as well as to
their self-esteem. A correlational analysis was
conducted to test these hypotheses.
Criteria. Two measures of consistency and one measure
of information search were derived for both Task 1 and
Task 2. The number of policy changes during a task and
27
the time elapsed before changing the original policy
were the two measures of consistency. The number of
account balance requests during a task was the one
measure of information search utilized in this study.
This measure has been used in past research (Knight &
Nadel, 1986), as have the other two measures. A lack
of informati search, or account balance requests, was
thought to be related to consistent/committed decision
making since a committed individual would probably find
this information irrelevant, whereas an experimenting
individual would probably find this information
relevant to his or her future decisions.
28
Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations
among the variables directly related to the predictions
made in this study are presented in Tables 1 through 2.
An overview of these data show that the pattern of
results was, in general, the opposite of what was
expected. The results of specific predictions will be
presented in more detail below.
Self-esteem
The self-esteem scores of subjects in the present
study were quite similar to those found in previous
research (e.g. Knight & Nadel , 1986). The mean
self-esteem score for males was slightly higher than
the mean self-esteem score for females (33.8 vs. 32.9;
t =1.27, p > .05), and overall the self-esteem
scores of this college-aged sample was relatively high
(33.3). In addition, the reliability of the Rosenberg
self-esteem measure was found to be adequately high
(alpha = .84)
.
Trial 1 Predictions
A 2X2X2 ANOVA (previous failure/success X
instruction/no instruction X sex) was conducted in an
attempt to examine the effects of the independent
variables. Sex was included in the analyses because
Knight and Nadel, 1986, found sex to be related to
20
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Success/Fail and
Instruction/No Instruction Conditions
Variable
Instruction No Instruction
Success Fail Success Fail
Policy Changes--Tl Mean
s.d. .
63
87
2 .
1 .
03
56
68
88
2.
1 .
45
70
Acct Requests--Tl Mean
s.d.
2.
2.
09
73
2.
2.
00
17
1
2
63
25
2.
2.
87
72
Time—Tl Mean
s.d.
17
8.
88
16
11
7 ,
43
60
17
8
02
36
10.
7.
16
90
Policy Changes—T2 Mean
s.d.
3.
1.
40
48
2
1
4 9
22
3
1
22
31
2
1
26
59
Acct Requests--T2 Mean
s.d.
1
I
38
70 1
97
15
1
1
42
36
1
1
21
44
Time--T2 Mean
s.d.
4
2
75
82
7
4
83
53
6
3
00
80
9
6
16
88
Ql--Same D.M. Mean
s.d.
4
2
81
07
3
1
97
76
4
1
22
74
3
1
84
37
Q2—Con/Exp D.M. Mean
s.d.
4
1
28
76
1
1
11
59
4
1
24
51
3
1
97
62
Q3--S/F Yes/No Mean
s.d.
1 03
18
1 20
41
1 .00
00
1 16
44
Q4--S-Changes Mean
s.d.
1
1
.75
41
1
1
.71
62
1
1
.66
.18
1
1
97
62
Q5— F-Changes Mean
s.d.
5
1
.75
.50
4
2
.20
.64
5
1
.68
.33
3
2
.90
.00
Q6--S-Feel Mean
s.d.
5
1
.88
.70
4
2
. 17
.28
6 .37
.83
4
1
.45
.91
Q7--F-Feel Mean
s.d.
2
1
.38
.16
2
1
.20
.37
2 .73
.98
2
1
.53
.22
Q8-- Background Mean
s.d.
3
1
. 19
.40
4
1
.46
.58
4
1
.12
.60
3
1
.08
.24
Q9-- Importance Mean
s.d.
3
1
.78
.56
4
1
.03
.56
4
1
.02
.62
3
1
.00
.16
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experimentation in their study, with women changing
policies more frequently than men.
In terms of the dependent variable, number of
policy changes during the first task, there was a main
effect for the success/fail variable ( F (1,138) =
53.9, p < .01; see Table 3). Subjects who failed
changed, on the average, 2.25 times whereas subjects
who succeeded changed, on the average, 0.66 times. Of
course this is to be expected on the first task, since
a subject who is continually succeeding on a task is
very unlikely to change his or her policy decisions in
contrast to a subject who is continually failing on a
task. There was, as expected, no main effect for
instruction since the instruction manipulation did not
occur until after the first task. In addition, there
was not a significant main effect for sex ( F (1,138)
= 2.2, p > .05). Finally, none of the 2-way or 3-way
interactions were significant.
The number of account balance requests was also
examined during the first task (see Table 4). This
variable was predicted to be indicative of
experimentation, because the subject is searching for
information when he or she requests information about
the balance of his or her account. If the subject was
consistent/committed in his or her decision-making
32
Table 3
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Numbe r of Policy
Changes Task 1.
Source df MS F Sifi of F
Sex 1 3.81 2.22
Success/Fail 1 92.46 53.90 .01
Instruction 1 1.56 0.92
Sex X Success/Fail 1 1.89 1.10
Sex X Instruction 1 0.30 0.18
Success/Fail X Instruction 1 1.46 0.85
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr 1 1.35 0.78
Error 138 1.72
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Table 4
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Number of Account
Balance Requests—Task 1
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex 1 3.77 0.61
Success/Fail 1 13.98 2.27
Instruction 1 1.16 0.19
Sex X Success/Fail 1 0.13 0.02
Sex X Instruction 1 0.97 0.16
Success/Fail X Instruction 1 18.93 3.08
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr 1 9.87 1.60
Error 138 6.15
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behavior, an account balance would probably seem
irrelevant, since he or she feels that the decision
made is the correct one even if it is failing and
losing money. However, the analysis conducted on this
variable revealed no significant main effects or
interactions for the independent variables of sex and
success/fail ( F (1,138) < 1.0, P > .05; F (1,138)
= 2.27, p > .05, respectively). (Again, it should be
remembered that the instruction and success/fail
manipulations will be more relevant to the second trial
where the specific predictions of this study will be
examined.
)
Another measure of experimentation utilized in
this study was the time elapsed before changing an
original policy decision. (Of course, the time elapsed
is a simulated time period from 2 to 24 weeks.) As
with the number of policy changes, the only significant
effect was for success/fail ( F (1,138) = 25.1, p <
.01; see Table 5). Again, this is to be expected since
a person in the success condition would be very unwise
to change a policy when it is consistently successful
(i.e. 17.40 weeks, on the average, elapsed before
subjects in the success condition changed an original
policy decision, while 10.77 weeks, on the average,
elapsed before subjects in the fail condition changed
35
Table 5
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Time Elapsed
Before Changing Policies—Task 1.
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex 1 143.00 2.24
Success/Fail 1 1605.58 25.10 .01
Instruction 1 27.90 0.44
Sex X Success/Fail 1 30.04 0.47
Sex X Instruction 1 9.06 0.14
Success/Fail X Instruction 1 6.32 0.10
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr 1 110.15 1.72
Error 138 63.97
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an original policy decision).
Trial 2 Predictions
The same analyses reported above were conducted on
the Task 2 data. The specific predictions with regard
to the success/fail and instruction/no instruction
manipulations on a subject's experimenting behavior can
now be assessed. The first measure of experimentation,
number of policy changes, showed that there was a
significant main effect for the success/fail
manipulation ( F (1,138) = 16.95, p < .01; see Table
6). Remember that all of the subjects failed on the
second task; the success/fail manipulation involved
half of the subjects failing on the first task and half
of the subjects succeeding. An analysis of the
individual cell means for the second task shows,
however, that the pattern is the opposite of what was
expected. That is, subjects who succeeded on the first
task changed, on the average, 3.30 times during the
second task, while subjects who failed on the first
task changed, on the average, 2.37 times (see Figure
2).
In terms of the instruction/no instruction
manipulation, however, the means followed the predicted
pattern (i.e. 2.93 vs. 2.76 policy changes for the
instruction and no instruction conditions,
37
Table 6
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Number o f Policy
Changes Task 2.
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex 1 5.55 2.88
Success/Fail 1 32.65 16.95 .01
Instruction 1 2.07 1.08
Sex X Success/Fail 1 5.71 2.96 .09
Sex X Instruction 1 0.60 0.31
Success/Fail X Instruction 1 0.17 0.09
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr 1 2.98 1.55
Error 138 1.93
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The Effects of Previous Failure and Instruction on
the Number of Policy Changes made by a Subject
39
respectively). However, this difference was not
significant ( F (1,138) = 1.08, p > .05; see Figure
2). Again, none of the higher-order interactions were
significant. It should be remembered that a two-way
interaction (success/fail X instruction) was predicted.
That is, it was thought that the combination of
previous failure and instruction would result in more
policy changes than what would be predicted by simply
summing the two main effects together. The analysis
showed that this was not the case ( F (1,138) < 1.0,
p > .05)
.
Finally, ANOVAs were conducted on the remaining
dependent variables: number of account balance
requests (see Table 7) and time elapsed before changing
an original policy decision (see Table 8). First, the
ANOVA conducted on the account balance measure revealed
no significant results ( F (1,138) = 1.66, p > .05;
F (1,138) < 1.0, p > .05 for success/fail and
instruction, respectively). However, there was a
significant main effect for the success/fail
manipulation on the amount of time elapsed before
changing the original policy ( F (1,138) = 15.8, p <
.01). Again, however, the pattern of means was
opposite of what was expected. That is, subjects who
had failed on the first task allowed more time to
40
Table 7
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Number of Account
Balance Requests—Task 2
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex
Success/Fail
Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail
Sex X Instruction
Success/Fail X Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr
Error 138
3 50 1 76
3 30 1 66
45 23
30 15
01 01
84 42
6 16 3 10
1 .99
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Table 8
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Time Elapsed
Before Changing Policies—Task 2.
Source df MS Sig of F
Sex
Success/Fail
Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail
Sex X Instruction
Success/Fail X Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr
Error
13.07 0.58
357.33 15.81
64.89 2.87
93.68 4.15
40.37 1.79
0.85 0.04
0.54 0.02
138 22.60
.01
092
044
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elapse before changing their original policy on the
second task than did subjects who had succeeded on the
first task (8.52 weeks vs. 5.45 weeks). Once again,
there was no main effect for the instruction
manipulation on the time elapsed measure ( F (1,138) =
2.87, p > .05). Further, the success/fail by
instruction interaction was not significant ( F
(1,138) < 1.0, p > .05). There was, however, a
significant sex by success/fail interaction ( F
(1,138) =4.15, p_ < .05). Women who failed on the
first task allowed 9.45 weeks to elapse, on the
average, before changing an original (Task 2) policy,
while women who succeeded allowed 16.82 weeks to
elapse, on the average, before changing an original
(Task 2) policy decision. Men, on the other hand, who
failed on the first task allowed 12.36 weeks to elapse,
on the average, before changing an original (Task 2)
policy decision, while men who succeeded allowed 18.06
weeks to elapse, on the average, before changing an
original (Task 2) policy decision.
One final analysis attempted to assess the
potential importance of the instruction manipulation.
The analyses reported above did not reveal any
instruction effects. Though there were no significant
results in these analyses, it seems possible that the
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instruction manipulation may only work on subjects who
were extremely consistent (operationally defined as not
changing policy options during the first task). The
instruction manipulation may be unnecessary for
subjects who already have a tendency toward
experimentation. An ANOVA was therefore conducted on
data from subjects who did not change policy options
during the first task. The analysis, however, did not
reveal a significant instruction effect for the number
of policy changes measure ( F (1,48) = 2.02, p >
.05; see Table 9) or time elapsed measure ( F (1,48) =
2.89, p > .05; see Table 10).
Self-esteem effects
In order to assess the relationship between
self-esteem and experimenting management, correlational
analyses were conducted on self-esteem and the three
measures of experimentation utilized in this study.
Past research, it should be remembered, showed
self-esteem to be negatively related to experimentation
(Knight & Nadel, 1986) .
The correlation between self-esteem and the
measures of experimentation (Tasks 1 and 2) were all
nonsignificant (see Table 2). More specifically, on
the first task the correlation between self-esteem and
the number of policy changes was r = -0.06, between
44
Table 9
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Number of Policy
Changes Task 2. (If Number of Changes on Task 1 Equals Zero)
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex
Success/Fail
Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail
Sex X Instruction
Success/Fail X Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr
Error 48
4.95
15.46
3.42
6.18
0.36
0.08
0.40
1.70
2.91
9.10
2.02
3.64
0.21
0.05
0.23
094
.01
.07
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Table 10
ANOVA Summary Table. Dependent Measure: Time Elapsed Before
Chansing-Task 2. (If Number of Changes on Task 1 Equals Zero)
Source df MS F Sig of F
Sex
Success/Fail
Instruction
Sex X Success/Fail
Sex X Instruction
Success/Fail X Instruction 1
Sex X Success/Fail X Instr 1
Error
1 10.68 0.69 —
1 14.67 0.94 --
1 44.91 2.89 .096
1 193.21 12.43 .01
1 0.00 0.00 --
0. 13 0.01 --
8
69.14
15.54
4.45 .04
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self-esteem and the number of account balance requests
was r = -0.01 , and between self-esteem and the
amount of time elapsed before changing an original
policy decision was r = 0.02. On the second task,
the correlation between self-esteem and the number of
policy changes was r = 0.00, between self-esteem and
the number of account balance requests was r = 0.07,
and between self-esteem and the time elapsed before
changing an original policy decision was r = 0.06.
In addition, self-esteem was not significantly
correlated with sex ( r = 0.11, p > .05; coded female
= 1 , male = 2 ) as had been found in previous research
(e.g. Knight & Nadel , 1986). In fact, the only
variable significantly correlated with self-esteem was
question 7 of the post-test questionnaire, "How did you
feel when you thought you were failing," (scale ranged
from 1 very bad, to 7 very good; r = 0.19, p_ <
.01).
The lack of overall self-esteem effects may have
resulted from there being a positive correlation
between self-esteem and experimentation in one group
(i.e. the success or fail group) and a negative
correlation between self-esteem and experimentation in
the other group. A correlational analysis on the
separate groups again revealed no significant
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correlations between self-esteem and the three measures
of experimentation. Although the correlation between
self-esteem and the number of policy changes on the
second task was in the predicted direction in the
success group, the correlation was not significant ( r
=
-.13, p > . 10)
.
Self-esteem vs. Reactance theory
An attempt was made to contrast the competing
theories of reactance theory and self-esteem (see
Introduction), in order to find the one theory that
best explains the increase in experimentation after
failure (Staw & Ross, 1978). Recall that in this
study, the predictions made by reactance theory and a
"malleable self-esteem theory" are identical when a
subject suffers a previous failure on a task and is
then asked to perform the same or similar task a short
time later (i.e. the prediction is that the subjects
will increase their experimenting behavior).
In regard to "malleable self-esteem theory," the
present study did not find a relationship between
self-esteem and experimentation ( r (2nd task) = .00).
Thus there is no reason to expect that subjects will
experiment more when their self-esteem is theoretically
lowered after a failure ( "malleable" self-esteem
theory). This lack of a relationship indicates that
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self-esteem and experimentation may not be as strongly
related as originally thought and therefore a possible
explanation for increased experimentation after failure
based on a decrease in self-esteem is questionable.
(Note that it is still possible that a subject's
self-esteem lowers after a previous failure, but
according to the results from this study, the lowered
self-esteem is not related to his or her increased
experimentation.
)
In addition, the lack of increased experimentation
(from 2.25 policy changes on the first task to 2.37
policy changes on the second task) found for both low
and high self-esteem subjects after a previous failure,
raises questions about the validity of both reactance
theory and "malleable" self-esteem theory explanations.
Recall that both of these theories predict a
significant increase in the amount of experimentation
after a previous failure. Therefore the evidence from
the present study does not support reactance theory or
"malleable" self-esteem theory.
Post-test Questionnaire
Subjects who did succeed on the first task not
only showed, behaviorally , an increased tendency toward
experimentation on the second task, they also
acknowledged this tendency cognitively, by stating on
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the post-test questionnaire that they changed policies
during failure ("Did you change policies when you felt
you were failing?" mean response = 5.7 ; scale, 1 =
"definitely did not change" to 7 "definitely did
change"). (See Tables 1-2 for the post-test
questionnaire results.) In contrast, subjects who
failed on the first task had an average response of 4.0
on this question. The correlation between fail/success
(coded 1, 2, respectively) and the subject's response
to this question was statistically significant ( r =
.40, p < .01).
As can be seen in Tables 1-2, there is a large
difference (6.2 vs. 4.3) between the mean responses of
subjects in the success and fail conditions to question
6 ( "How did you feel when you thought you were
succeeding?" r = .47, e < .01). This difference
is expected since subjects in the fail condition never
had the opportunity to succeed and therefore probably
just gave the average response to this question.
As predicted, there was a significant correlation
between question 7 ("How did you feel when you thought
you were failing?") and self-esteem ( r = .194, p <
.01). This suggests that subjects higher in
self-esteem tended to be less concerned with failure
than subjects lower in self-esteem. However, in this
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study this relative lack of concern among high
self-esteem subjects was not reflected in any lack of
experimentation when compared to low self-esteem
subjects
.
There was a significant correlation between
question 9 ("Do you think it is important to remain
consistent (staying with a certain policy or decision)
even in the face of failure?") and the fail (coded 1)
and success (coded 2) conditions ( r = .139, e <
.05). In addition, there was a significant correlation
between question 1 ("Was your decision making the same
during the first and second tasks?") and the
success/fail manipulation ( r = .165, p < .05). Of
course, this is consistent with the results presented
earlier (i.e. subjects in the success condition became
significantly more experimenting during the second
task, while subjects in the fail condition did not
change their decision making from task to task).
Finally, question 3 ("Did you know when you were
failing or succeeding on these tasks?" coded 1 = yes,
2 = no) was also significantly correlated with the
success/fail manipulation ( r = -.259, p < .01).
(In addition, 92% of the subjects agreed with this
statement, 99% in the success condition and 85% in the
fail condition. Given the restricted variance of this
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item, this correlation is relatively high. ) Question
4 ("Did you change policies when you were
succeeding?"), on the other hand, was not correlated
with the success/fail manipulation ( r = -.052, p >
.05). The results from both question 3 and question 4
can be explained by noting that subjects in the fail
condition never experienced success and therefore did
not know when they were succeeding. (However, since
question 3 asks about both failing and succeeding it
could be suggested that failing subjects did not
realize they were failing because they had denied
reality
.
)
In an attempt to look for interaction effects, a
multivariate analysis of variance ( MANOVA ) was
conducted on the nine questions from the post-test
questionnaire. The multivariate F was significant
for the interaction between success/fail and
instruction ( F (8, 130) = 3.14, p < .01).
The significant success/fail by instruction
interaction was explained by question 8 ( F (1,138) =
22.2, p < .01) and question 9 ( F (1,138) = 5.76, p_
< .05) of the post-test questionnaire. Subjects rated
the background stories as having more of an effect on
them (question 8) when they were in the success and
instruction condition as compared to when they were in
52
the success and no instruction condition; conversely,
subjects rated the background stories as having more of
an effect on them when they were in the failure and no
instruction condition as compared to when they were in
the failure and instruction condition. In question 9,
subjects thought it was less important to remain
consistent to a failing policy when they were in the
failure and instruction condition as compared to when
they were in the failure and no instruction condition.
Subjects in the instruction and success group and
subjects in the no instruction and success groups,
however, did not differ significantly in their response
to this question.
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Discussion
The present study attempted to examine variables
thought to be related to experimenting management. In
addition, since it has been pointed out that
experimentation can be beneficial in management contexts
(Campbell, 1969), an instruction condition was included
in this study. The study, therefore, not only attempted
to better understand experimenting management, it also
attempted to instruct subjects to become more
experimenting when a certain policy decision was failing.
In terms of this study's first objective, the
results reported above show that some of the variables
thought to be related to experimentation may not be as
strongly related as originally thought. For example, in
this study self-esteem was not found to be related to
experimentation although it has in past research (e.g.
Knight & Nadel, 1986). It is possible, of course, that
self-esteem and experimentation are only related to each
other in certain situations. In the Knight and Nadel
study, for example, subjects received feedback, on the
average, every 3.23 weeks (in a 24 week simulation very
similar to the present simulation), whereas they received
feedback every two weeks in the present study. Thus in
the Knight and Nadel study, subjects received feedback
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approximately eight times during the entire simulation,
while in the present study subjects received feedback
twelve times. It seems possible, therefore, that
self-esteem may play more of a role in experimenting
management when the amount of feedback is somewhat
limited
.
When subjects are failing on a task and are
receiving a relatively large amount of feedback informing
them of their failure, it seems plausible that they will
be more inclined to change policies regardless of their
self-esteem. However, when negative feedback is more
limited, the person with high self-esteem may be more
likely to stay with a certain policy since their failure
may seem less obvious or inevitable. When more constant
feedback is provided, the high self-esteem subject can no
longer rely on self- justification to remain with a
failing policy. Thus, according to this hypothesis, the
relationship between self-esteem and experimentation may
be more situationally specific than once thought. If
this is the case, the negative effects thought produced
by a high self-esteem manager who is failing can be
greatly reduced by providing more feedback to him or her.
Another variable found to be unrelated to
experimentation was instruction. Various theories can be
55
offered in an attempt to explain why the instructing of
subjects in the positive aspects of experimentation had
no effect. The most likely explanation is that the
manipulation in this study was too weak. In an effort to
avoid demand characteristics, the instruction had to be
done subtly, and this may have reduced its potential
effectiveness. As a result, the subjects in the
instruction condition may not have been instructed as it
was assumed they were. Instruction could still be
beneficial in certain contexts and therefore should not
be dismissed because of the results from this study.
That is, in a real work situation, managers will not be
concerned with demand characteristics and will provide
"true" instruction on the beneficial aspects of
experimentation. A stronger manipulation such a this may
produce the results that were expected in this study
(i.e. an increase in experimentation with instruction).
However, recall that there was a significant
instruction by success/fail interaction for question 9 of
the post-test questionnaire ("Do you think it is
important to remain consistent even in the face of
failure?"). Examining the means from these groups
revealed that instruction did have an effect when
subjects were in the failure group. That is, subjects in
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this condition thought it was less important to remain
consistent in the face of failure. Thus, subjects may at
least realize cognitively that remaining committed to a
failing policy is not a wise decision. It is possible
that subjects in the instruction/fail condition did not
increase their experimentation on Task 2 because they may
have felt that they had experimented as much as they
could and still failed (i.e. on the average, they changed
2.49 times on the second task which means that most of
the subjects tried each policy, or at least two of the
policies, at least once). Thus there may have been a
ceiling effect on the amount of experimentation for this
group (of course, these subjects could have changed
twelve times, but they could also try every possible
policy with just two policy changes). It is possible, of
course, that the reason instruction had no differential
effects on subjects in the success condition was because
these subjects simply ignored this information, finding
it irrelevant to their situation.
There was also a significant instruction by
success/fail interaction for question 8 of the post-test
questionnaire. However, because of the way this question
was worded, no simple interpretation of this interaction
is possible.
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The lack of support found for reactance theory was
also unexpected. Recall that Staw and Ross (1978) found
reactance theory to be the best predictor of their
results on the escalation of commitment. There are at
least two explanations for why reactance theory was not
supported in this study. First, it is possible that
subjects who failed on the first task saw their failure
as resulting from chance factors. Recall that Staw and
Ross (1978) found support for reactance theory when
subjects attributed their previous failure to endogenous
rather than chance factors. Second, the subjects may
have viewed the two tasks in this study as separate and,
as a result, the effects of Task 1 failure may not have
carried over to a related Task 2 failure.
Though the results from this study did not match the
predictions made by reactance theory, the results did
match learned helplessness theory as described by Staw
and Ross (1978) and Garber and Seligman (1980). Staw and
Ross note, "if an individual has met with repeated
failure in his previous decision making, he may conclude
that there is no relationship between action and
consequences and therefore cease to utilize relevant
information in decision situations. The learned helpless
individual is extremely low in prospective focusing and
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tends to simply repeat the same behavior, even if this
behavior is inappropriate for a new set of circumstances.
With a learned helplessness effect, commitment would thus
likely remain high even with repeated negative
consequences" (p. 45).
Subjects who had previously failed on the first
task, it should be remembered, changed fewer times on the
second task than subjects who had previously succeeded on
the first task. It is possible, according to learned
helplessness theory, that the subjects who had previously
failed did not increase their experimenting on the second
task (2.25 policy changes vs. 2.37 policy changes)
because they had discovered that their behavior
(experimenting decision making) was unrelated to their
ultimate success or failure.
Though these subjects changed policies 2.37 times on
the second task, this was not a significant increase from
2.25 changes on the first task. In fact, the consistency
of this measure provides support for Staw and Ross'
(1978) learned helplessness explanation that the subjects
simply repeated their same behavior (i.e. change policies
approximately two times) on the two tasks. Subjects in
the success condition, however, increased their
experimentation from 0.66 policy changes on the first
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task to 3.30 policy changes on the second task. Since
the subjects who succeeded on the first task thought
their decision making was related to their success, they
were more willing to try new policies and experiment
since they probably believed it would eventually lead to
a reversal in the sales decline (second task scenario)
and thus allow them to succeed (i.e. these subjects had
made a connection between their behavior and their
consequences). Subjects who had previously failed, on
the other hand, may have simply decided to get the task
over with and not try other policy options (or simply
repeat their same Task 1 behavior) since they probably
felt that regardless of which policy they chose it would
not lead to success (learned helplessness). (See Staw &
Ross, 1978.
)
In order to more directly test this learned
helplessness explanation an analysis was conducted in
which each task (Task 1 and Task 2) was divided into two
separate time periods (i.e. week 1 to week 12 vs. week 12
to week 24). It would be predicted according to Staw and
Ross' (1978) learned helplessness explanation, that
subjects would either experiment less or experiment to
the same extent on the second half of the task if they
failed on the first part of the task. (According to Staw
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and Ross' definition, the only evidence that would not
support learned helplessness would be the finding that
subjects increased their experimentation on the second
half of the tasks.) An ANOVA was therefore conducted on
each of these separate time periods for the number of
policy changes dependent measure. Subjects did not
decrease their experimentation significantly on the
second half of the task when they had previously failed
(e.g. on Task 2 subjects changed, on the average, 1.1
times during the first 12 weeks of the task and changed,
on the average, 0.97 times during the last 12 weeks of
the task; F (1,72) = 2.16, p > .05). In addition,
subjects decreased their experimentation significantly on
the second task when they were in the success condition
(i.e. 1.69 changes, on the average, in the first 12 weeks
and 1.34 changes, on the average, in the final 12 weeks;
F (1,72) = 6.39, p < .05) .
A possible explanation for why reactance theory was
not supported in this study is that the failure on the
first task may have been too discouraging for the
subjects. Research by Brockner, Gardner, Bierman, Mahan,
Thomas, Weiss, Winters, and Mitchell (1983) and Brehm and
Brehm (1981) lends support to this hypothesis. These
researchers suggest that learned helplessness and
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reactance theory are related in that a person who has
experienced continued failure will experience learned
helplessness, but a person who has experienced less
severe, or moderate, failure will experience reactance
and thus try to improve his or her performance. In the
Staw and Ross (1978) study the first task consisted of
only one policy decision and therefore if the subject
failed he or she was provided with negative feedback only
once (thus allowing reactance rather than helplessness to
be activated in the subject). (In the present study,
subjects were provided with negative feedback 12 times
during the first task. ) In addition, Staw and Ross
provided subjects with an explanation (endogenous or
exogenous) for why their decision failed, the present
study, on the other hand, did not. These explanations
may have allowed subjects who failed a reason to change
policies at future opportunities.
Thus it seems that in this study the relevant factor
in the amount of experimentation on a future task is the
belief that one's behavior or, more specifically, one's
decision making, is not futile but rather is directly
related to one's consequences. In fact, if a subject
succeeds on the first task and fails on the second task,
he or she will not become "super-committed" to his or her
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decisions on the second task (this is especially true
during the first part of the second task), but will
rather have the freedom to question his or her behavior
and try other policy options (a type of reactance theory
that does not rely strictly on a "previous" failure, but
can also include present failure). A subject who
previously succeeds, in other words, builds up enough
"credit" to not have to protect his or her public image
and can thus experiment with other policy options until
the correct one is found.
Conclusion
The results from this study, though inconsistent
with some of the predictions made earlier, should provide
a more clear and comprehensive view of experimenting
management. The following is a brief summary of this
study's major findings.
1) Self-esteem may not be as strongly related to
experimenting management as originally thought.
This is especially true when subjects are provided
with a great deal of negative feedback on their
performance
.
2) Instructing subjects to be more experimenting may
only be effective when the instruction is explicit.
More research is needed in order to find the type
and degree of instruction necessary. However,
recall that subjects did seem to understand the
importance of experimenting when they were in the
instruction and fail condition.
3) According to the present findings, a person who
succeeds on a task does not necessarily become
63
less experimenting (i.e. more committed) on a
subsequent task. The person may actually become
more experimenting in the subsequent task if he or
she is failing. This could result from not having
to be as defensive about his or her decision making
as a person who continually fails on a task. A
person who always fails and never succeeds may
decide that his or her decision making is not
related to the outcomes and thus experience
learned helplessness.
4) Reactance theory will probably not be relevant in
situations where a person is experiencing learned
helplessness
.
These results do provide a simplified model of some
of the relevant variables that determine whether a
person's decision making is experimenting or consistent
(see Figure 3). Note that self-esteem will have its
strongest effect on experimenting or consistent decision
making when the subject has no previous experience with
the current task.
The results do provide some practical benefits to
organizations as well. To begin with, the benefits
provided by high or low self-esteem in managers are
situationally determined. Providing constant feedback
may eliminate any confounding effects produced by
self-esteem. Second, providing positive feedback on a
previous task may allow a person to become more
experimenting on a subsequent task where he or she is
failing. Third, constant negative feedback could result
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Figure 3
Variables Related to Whether a Person will be
Experimenting or Consistent in his or her Decision Making
> Consistent D. M. or
Learned Helplessness
(High)
>Consistent
D. M.
Self-Esteem
> Experimenting
(Low) D. M.
> Experimenting D.M.
Note: Explicit instruction can affect the decision making
at any point in this figure.
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in a learned helplessness condition. This learned
helplessness may be partially avoided if the person is
provided with explanations for why he or she failed or is
failing on a task. These explanations can help the
person understand his or her mistakes and make his or her
failure seem less unavoidable in the future. Finally, an
instruction program that clearly states its objectives
may provide an opportunity for an overly consistent
individual to become more experimenting in his or her
decision making. Though a program such as this was not
specifically examined in this study, the benefits
provided by a manager who is willing to question his or
her past decision making and who is able to experiment
with new and more effective programs should provide us
with an incentive to try new instruction methods that
will not only produce more experimenting managers, but
also produce more research on the field of experimenting
and consistent decision making.
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Appendix A
(Task One Instructions-Jet-Engine Scenario)
"Welcome to the management computer simulation, or MCS
.
MCS is a computer program that simulates a number of common
organizational problems, and asks you to play the part of a
manager whose task it is to solve one of these problems
within a given period of time. You will be working on a
problem called 'the jet engine problem.' In just a moment
information about this problem will be presented..."
"Several times during the simulation you will be asked
to choose between several options. The computer will
present your options, and tell you to type in a number
corresponding to the option you want..."
"Now to explain the simulation. This version of MCS is
called 'the jet engine problem.' It is based upon actual
reports of similar events in a large manufacturing company,
and the solution is based upon what was done to solve that
company's problem. You will play the role of the manager of
a division of a large airline corporation. You supervise
six foremen and ar personally responsible for all policy
decisions made in your division."
"In the past year a serious production problem has
developed in your division. During this time the percentage
of defective engines being produced has risen from zero
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percent to two percent. Major air disasters have occurred
more frequently as a result of these defects. The FAA
(Federal Aviation Administration) has stated that the defect
rate must not be above zero percent. The higher the
percentage of defective jet engines the more likely it is
that people will be killed in airplane crashes. Not only do
you want to save lives, you also want to make a profit.
That is, you have to stay in business if you want to make
money. The amount of money your company makes will be
related how good your jet engines are. If they are good
(zero percent defect rate) you will not only make money but
also save lives."
"To try to find out why the number of defective engines
has risen, you hired a consultant to come to the factory,
examine your production line, and recommend a solution to
your problem. After a thorough examination of the facility,
the consultant suggested three possible remedies to your
problem.
"
"The consultant's suggestions are:
1. Increase the number of inspectors at several points
in the production process, thereby reducing the
chances that an error at an early production stage
wqould go unnoticed and eventually ruin an engine.
2. Redesign the engines to avoid structural problems
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that could be increasing the chances for the type
of defects you are having.
3. Use stronger metals which would be less likely to
develop defects. These metals would be more
expensive than those currently in use, but if they
reduce the defect rate, it might pay off."
"The consultant stressed that it was not possible to to
determine the exact cause of the production problem, and
that he could make no guarantees about which of the plans
would sovle the problem, or how quickly any of th plans
would solve the problem, or how quickly any of the plans
might work. He was, however, able to rank the three plans
in the order of their estimated effectiveness, based upon
his past experience in similar situations. The consultant's
ranks (from best to worse) were:
1. Hiring new inspectors
2. Redesigning the engines
3. Using stronger metals
The consultant estimated that all of the plans would cost
the same amount to implement."
"Before taking any action, you held a meeting with your
foremen to get their ideas on the three plans. Generally,
the foremen agreed with the consultant's ranks, though they
also felt that it would be impossible to make any guarantees
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about which plan would be successful."
"Rules for the game: (for simplicity this simulation
will use dollar amounts and decreased defect rates as the
measure of success, not saved lives.)
1. You will start out with $10,000 in your operating
operating budget. This amount will be increased
or decreased during the simulation, depending upon
what you do and how successful you are.
2. It will cost you $1000 to implement your first
policy, or to change to a new policy later on.
This is to cover the costs of the new policy (e.g.
hiring new workers, purchasing new materials, etc.).
3. It will cost you $100 for each week that the defect
rate is above two percent. You will earn $100 for
each week that your policy has lowered the defect
rate below two percent.
4. It will cost you $50 to find out how much money is
left in your operating budget.
5. At least one of the policies will solve the
production problem. You should be aware, however,
that the correct policy may or may not solve the
problem immediately. That is, while implementing the
correct policy may reduce the defect rate in a few
weeks, it may have to be in effect for a longer
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period of time before it will solve the problem.
When you change policies, the old policy will be
discontinued
.
6. You have 24 weeks to solve the production problem.
7. You will receive feedback on how you are doing every
two weeks.
8. Your goals are to solve the production problem
before the 24 weeks are up by reducing the defect
rate to zero percent, and to have as much money left
as possible .
"
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Appendix B
Task 2 Simulation*
"Welcome back to the management computer simulation,
or MCS. MCS is a computer program that simulates a number
of organizational problems, and asks you to play the part
of a manager whose task it is to solve one of these
problems within a given period of time."
"As a result of your performance on the first task,
your superiors have decided that you should be transferred
to the sales and public relations department of this
company. It is thought that your managerial skills could
be used more effectively there than at the jet engine
division ..."
"Now to explain the simulation. This version of MCS
is called the 'ticket bureau problem.' It is based upon
actual reports of similar events in a large sales and
manufacturing company, and is based upon what was done to
solve that company's problem. You will play the role of
the manager of a division of a large airline corporation
(the same company you worked for on the first task). Your
division is interested in increasing the sales of a ticket
bureau in the North central United States. You are
personally responsible for all decisions made in your
division.
"
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"In the past year the sales from this ticket bureau
have decreased by 2% (this 2% decrease translates into
millions of dollars of lost profits). Your supervisors
are quite upset about this decline and expect you to be
able to turn things around and curb this decline. Thus
your task is simple, you must stop this decline and get
sales back to normal. Doing so will mean that your
company will save millions of dollars in lost profits."
"To try to find out why the sales have decreased, you
hired a consultant to come to your office and recommend a
solution to your problem. After a thorough examination of
the ticket bureau, the consultant suggested three possible
remedies to your problem."
"The consultant's suggestions are:
1. Lower the cost of passenger airline tickets thus
increasing the number of ticket sales, but also
lowering the profit made on each individual sale.
2. Implement a national advertising campaign to
attract new business.
3. Begin a frequent flyer program whereby frequent
flyers get special bonuses for traveling a lot on
your airline, thus keeping reliable customers and
possibly attracting new ones."
"The consultant stressed that it was not possible to
78
determine the exact cause of the sales decline, and that
he could make no guarantees about which of the plans would
stop the decline, or how quickly any of the plans might
work. He was, however, able to rank the three plans in
the order of their estimated effectiveness, based upopn
his past experience in similar situations. The
consultant's rank (from best to worst) were:
1. Lower the cost of tickets
2. Advertising campaign
3. Frequent flyer program
The consultant estimated that all of the plans would cost
the same amount to implement."
"Before taking any action, you held a meeting with
your subordinates to get their ideas on the three plans.
Generally, the employees agreed with the consultant's
ranks, though they also felt that it would be impossible
to make any guarantees about which plan would be
successful .
"
* The rules and procedures for this second scenario are
essentially identical to the rules and procedures for the
first scenario. Refer to Appendix A for more details.
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Appendix C
Please answer the following questions by circling the number
that best corresponds to your reaction to that question.
Please feel free to write in any additional comments you may
have at the end of this questionnaire.
1. How would you describe your decision-making during
this task? (Please comment.)
Was your decision-making the same during the first and
second tasks?12 3 4 5 6 7
exactly the somewhat very
same different different
2. Do you think you were consistent (stayed with a specific
policy/decision) or experimenting (changed your policies/
decisions during the task) in your decision making?12 3 4 5 6 7
very very
consistent experimenting
3. Did you know when you were failing or succeeding on
these tasks? Yes No
(If you answered yes to the above question, please answer
the following questions below. If you answered no, go on
to question #4
.
)
Did you change policies when you felt you were
succeeding?12 3 4 5 6 7
definitely somewhat definitely
did not did change
change
Did you change policies when you felt you were failing?12 3 4 5 6 7
definitely somewhat definitely
did not did change
change
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How did you feel when you thought you were succeeding?12 3 4 5 6 7
very neither very
bad good nor bad good
How did you feel when you thought you were failing?12 3 4 5 6 7
very neither very
bad good nor bad good
4. Did the stories that you read, which provided the
background for your task, have any effect on your
decision-making?12 3 4 5 6 7
large moderate no
effect effect effect
5. Do you think it is important to remain consistent
(staying with a certain policy or decision) even in the
face of failure?12 3 4 5 6 7
very somewhat not
important important important
Comments
:
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Appendix D
(Instruction Data Sheet*)
Subject # 11
Week
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
Comments
Policy Defect Rate
2.0
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.5
2.4
2.7
2.8
2.7
2.9
2.9
2.6
2.8
Subject's performance was very poor. Stayed with
original policy long after it was clear that it
would not work. It is generally more effective
to experiment with different policies to find
one that works.
* The data-sheet given to the subjects was hand-written,
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Appendix E
(No-Instruction Data Sheet*)
Subject # 22
Defect Rate after 24-week period 0.4%.
Comments: Subject's performance was fairly good.
*The data-sheet given to the subjects was hand-written
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Appendix F
(Instruction data sheet to be filled out by subject*)
Subject #
Week Policy Defect Rate
2.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
Comments
:
* The data-sheet given to the subjects was hand-written,
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Appendix G
(No-Instruction Data Sheet*
Subject #
Defect Rate after 24-week period
Comments
:
The data-sheet given to the subjects was hand-written.
Subjects only entered their final defect rate on this
sheet
.
85
Appendix H
(Beginning Statement)
Since this is a learning task and you will be
allowed to see the performance of a previous subject and
a later subject will be allowed to see your performance,
we ask that you keep track of how you did during this
task. This is the form you will be using (show form),
once you get started on the task the form will become
self-explanatory. The comments will be added by me (the
experimenter), according to a set of predetermined
criteria once you are completely finished with this
experiment. Your data sheet will then be given to a
later subject to examine when he or she has completed the
same task that you have. Your confidentiality is
assured, please do not put your name on this sheet.
After you have completed the first task please
inform me. At that time I will give you the data sheet
from the previous subject who performed this task.
Please read over the data sheet and the comments. When
you are finished looking over this subject's data sheet
let me know. At that time the second half of this
experiment will begin.
86
Appendix I
(Success/Failure Feedback-Tasks 1 and 2)
Task 1-Success feedback
"Congratulations, you solved the 'jet engine
problem. ' After 24 weeks the defect rate is at 0%.
You have (*) dollars left in your account. If you have
any questions about this game, please ask the
experimenter. Thank you for participating in this
project .
"
Task 1-Failure feedback
"Your 24 weeks are up. During this time the
defect rate remained above zero percent (the defect
rate is now at 2.6%). Which means that you failed to
solve the production problem. You have (*) dollars
left in your account. If you have any questions about
this game, please ask the experimenter. Thank you for
participating in this project."
Task 2-Failure feedback
"Your 24 weeks are up. During this time the sales
did not significantly increase, which means that you
failed to solve the the ticket's bureau's sale decline.
You have exactly (*) dollars left in your account. If
you have any questions about this game, please ask the
experimenter. Thank you for participating in this
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project .
"
* The amount of money left in each subject's account
varied depending on how much he or she requested an
account balance during the simulation, if he or she was
in the success or failure condition (task 1 only), and
the number of policy changes he or she made. (See
Appendix A for more information on the rules of the
game . )
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Appendix J
Instructions: Indicate your agreement with each of
the following statements by circling the appropriate
number after each statement:
1. Strongly 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Strongly
agree ( SA ) (A) (D) disagree ( SD
)
1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at
least on a equal basis with others SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
2. I feel that I have a number of good
qualities SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel
that I am a failure SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
4. I am able to do things as well as
most other people SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
5 . I feel that I do not have much to be
proud of SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
6. I take a positive attitude toward my-
self SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with my-
self SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
8. I wish I could have more respect for
myself SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
9. I certainly feel useless at times.... SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
10. At times I think I am no good at
all SA A D SD
1 2 3 4
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Abstract
Past research has noted the beneficial aspects of
experimenting management (e.g. Campbell, 1969).
Experimenting managers, in contrast to committed or
consistent managers, are people who are open to
feedback and are willing to change policies or
decisions. Research has shown that certain variables
can enhance a person's likelihood of becoming
consistent rather than experimenting in his or her
decision making (e.g. self- just if ication and
self-esteem). The present study was a first attempt at
making individuals more experimenting rather than
consistent in their decision making.
Subjects, through vicarious learning, were
instructed about the beneficial aspects of
experimenting management. Subjects also suffered
previous failure in an attempt to make them more
experimenting in a future task (reactance theory). It
was predicted that previous failure and instruction
would cause a subject to become more experimenting in a
subsequent task. The results, however, showed that
previous failure and instruction had no major effect on
experimentation. In fact, subjects who had previously
failed were more consistent in their decision making
than subjects who had previously succeeded on a task.
Learned helplessness was discussed as a possible reason
for why these subjects became more committed to their
decisions. Finally, practical applications of this
research were also discussed.
